This paper studies the ability of nonmarket institutions to invest optimally in forward intergenerational goods (FIGs) "Be nice to your children, they will pick your nursing home." (Anonymous bumper sticker)
Every society uses a range of nonmarket institutions to decide how much to invest in future generations. A prominent example is the government and the decision of how much to invest on intergenerational (IG) public goods 1 such as environmental preservation and pure science. These programs entail a transfer to future generations since they are nanced with taxes on present generations and their bene ts are longlived. Another prominent example is the family. Every generation of parents decides how much to invest in their children. Investments include the cost of (public and private) education, and the myriad of other sacri ces that parents make for their children. These examples have a common structure. First, IG exchange takes place in an in nitely lived organization that has an overlapping generations (OLG) structure. Second, present generations have to decide how many resources to devote to investments that disproportionately bene t future generations. Third, once the investments are made, future generations cannot be excluded from the bene ts that are generated.
2 Fourth, since future generations have not yet been born, present and future generations cannot negotiate binding contracts that reimburse present generations for the cost of the investment.
3 Fifth, membership in the organization is not for sale: agents are born into the organization. As the following examples show, the last three characteristics are central to the problem because they rule out market-based solutions. To see the role of excludability, consider the case of publicly traded companies. Every period present generations of stockholders decide how much to invest to increase future pro ts. Here, the bene ts generated by IG investment are excludable since the share of pro ts received by an agent is proportional to the amount of stock that he owns. This organization satis es characteristics (4) and (5), but not (3). 4 The presence of a stock market induces members to internalize the effect of investments on future pro ts since they raise the price at which the stock can be sold. As a result, this market institution typically generates optimal IG investment.
To see the role of exogenous membership, consider the case of a country club, which is an organization with an overlapping generations structure in which membership has to be purchased. This organization satis es all of the characteristics listed above except exogenous membership. In contrast to the case of the rm, members cannot be excluded from investments such as golf courses. We can think of these organizations as IG clubs. 5 In the absence of externalities across clubs, a market solution in which club membership is a tradeable asset could generate optimal levels of investment.
Finally, to see the role of incomplete IG contracting, consider the case of the family. Even with sel sh generations, an ef cient amount of investment would take place if children and parents could sign binding contracts. 6 In the absence of "transaction costs," an IG form of the Coase Theorem would arise: children would commit to compensate their parents for the cost of the optimal investment, and parents would have an incentive to provide these investments. The problem is that in many organizations such contracts are not possible. In the case of the family, the legal system precludes these types of contracts since children lack the independence and understanding required to evaluate them. This paper develops a stylized model of IG exchange to study the conditions under which nonmarket institutions are able to generate Pareto-optimal levels of investment. Agents live for three periods: young, middle-aged, and old. Every period the middle-aged agent decides how much to invest in a forward intergenerational good (FIG) that bene ts future generations, but not himself. Although the role of altruism is studied in the paper, it is useful to start with the case of sel sh generations.
We start with an immediate observation. If the only decision made every period is how much to invest in FIGs, no investment takes place. The intuition is straightforward. Agents bene t from investments in FIGs made by past generations, but not by investments made after they are born. Thus, they have no incentive to invest in FIGs, and no FIGs are produced. We can conclude that optimal IG investment cannot arise when the only decision made by the organization is how much to invest in future generations.
Fortunately, in addition to choosing how much to invest in future generations, most nonmarket institutions also make decisions about backward IG exchange. For example, the government transfers resources to the elderly through the social security system, and families take care of their elderly parents. The main insight of this paper is that the presence of backward IG goods plays a crucial role in sustaining investment in future generations: without backward exchange, investment in FIGs is inef ciently low; but with it, even optimal investment by sel sh generations is possible. The crucial insight comes from the literature on multimarket contact in industrial organization [see Jonathan Bendor and Dilip Mookherjee (1990) and B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1990) ], which has shown that linkages across games play an important role in sustaining cooperation. 4 For the purpose of the example, we can think of membership as exogenous: everyone is a "member" of the organization but only agents with a positive amount of stock have a claim on the pro ts.
5 See Sandler (1982) . 6 The "intergenerational Coasian theorem" described here requires present and future generations to be able to bargain, face to face, and sign binding contracts. The ability to bind future generations to transfer resources to present generations is not suf cient: if present generations do not have an incentive to invest in future generations without compensation, they also have an incentive to impose transfers on future generations without investing in them.
To study the relationship between forward and backward IG exchange, we analyze a stylized model in which, every period, the middleaged agent makes two decisions: (1) how much to invest in a FIG, and (2) how much to buy of a backward intergenerational good (BIG) that only bene ts the elderly. Using this framework, in Section III we show that a link between BIGs and FIGs is essential for sustaining optimal levels of investment in future generations. We also show that the need for a link between BIGs and FIGs has the following implications. First, the social rate of return, risk characteristics, and horizon of the FIGs do not affect whether or not they are nanced. Second, within some limits, population aging can increase public investment in FIGs. Finally, making the provision of BIGs mandatory can crowd out investment in future generations.
In Section V we explore the implications of the analysis for two important IG organizations, the government and the family. There we answer the question posed in the title: why is social security good for the environment? Here is the bottom line. If a majority of the electorate receives positive bene ts from keeping the social security system, there are voting equilibria in which even sel sh generations vote to invest in FIGs. In these equilibria, investment in future generations is supported by a link between BIGs and FIGs: present voters correctly believe that future voters' support of social security depends on whether or not they invest in FIGs.
I. Relation with the Literature
Using the BIGs and FIGs framework, the literature on nonmarket IG organizations can be divided into three strands.
The rst strand studies organizations in which there is only intragenerational exchange. Jacques Cremer (1986 ), David Salant (1991 , Michihiro Kandori (1992 ), Lones Smith (1992 , and Kenneth Shepsle (1999) study OLG organizations in which every period all of the agents simultaneously take an action that affects every one alive at the time, but has no effect on future generations. For example, in Cremer (1986) , agents simultaneously choose how much effort to exert in production, and total output depends on the sum of the efforts. The main insight from this literature is that the standard "Folk Theorem" results extend to the OLG context: cooperation can be sustained as long as agents are patient and/or live long enough. The last condition is needed because agents in the last period of life cannot be given an incentive to cooperate. By contrast, the results developed in this paper are not limit results.
7
The second strand of the literature studies organizations in which the exchange problem looks like a BIG. Here the organization chooses how much to produce of a good that is basically a transfer from the younger to the older generations. Consider, for example, the "Pension Game" in Hammond (1975) , 8 in which he studies a standard OLG economy with two-period lifetimes. Agents have an endowment when young, but not when old, and have no access to a savings technology. Hammond shows that there are equilibria, similar to the one developed in Section III, subsection B, that sustain Paretoimproving transfers from young to old in every period. To study the political economy of payas-you-go social security, Hansson and Stuart (1989), Henning Bohn (1998) , and Cooley and Soares (1999) extend this model to a setting in which agents live for more than two periods and decisions are made by majority rule. The insights from all of these papers are similar to the results for BIGs in Sections III and V.
Two important papers in this literature are Kotlikoff et al. (1988) and David Kreps (1990) , who show that the presence of a sustainable BIG can be used to solve inef ciencies in the economy. Kotlikoff et al. (1988) study a standard OLG economy with two-period lifetimes in which every generation elects its own separate government. Each generational government faces a standard commitment problem: it would like to choose low capital tax rates but cannot credibly commit to do so. They show that the commitment problem can be overcome through the introduction of a self-sustainable "IG compact" in which every generation agrees to transfer a large sum to the previous generation as long as it has followed the compact and has chosen low capital tax rates for itself. Kreps (1990) shows that the transfers can be used to overcome moral hazard problems. As we do here, these papers show that linking the provision of a BIG with something else can be bene cial; in our case to provide investment in future generations, in Kotlikoff et al. and Kreps to solve an intragenerational incentive problem.
Next, several papers have studied organizations in which there are only FIGs and shown that underinvestment must take place. For example, Jacobus Doeleman and Sandler (1998) study investment in IG public goods in a nite OLG model and conclude that, with sel sh generations, underinvestment takes place [see also Kotlikoff and Robert Rosenthal (1993) and David Collard (2000) ]. By contrast, in this paper we study organizations in which both BIGs and FIGs are provided.
Finally, two other papers have argued that there is a link between forward and backward IG exchange. Gary Becker and Kevin Murphy (1988) suggest that it is possible to think of old age social insurance and education as a trade among generations: children receive an education from their parents and in exchange pay for their retirement bene ts. However, their's is mostly an accounting argument. They do not study the sustainability of these arrangements, which is the focus of this paper. This is problematic because when children grow up they can default on their obligations. Michele Boldrin and Ana Montes (1998) have independently developed an analysis that is closely related.
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They study the majority rule politics of pay-asyou-go social security and public education using an overlapping generations economy. Although there are some differences in the details of the model, both papers arrive at similar insights. In particular, their main result is analogous to Proposition 3 in this paper.
II. Model
Consider a simple model of an in nitely lived organization with an overlapping generations demographic structure. Each period t a new member, called generation t, enters the organization and stays there for three periods: t, t 1 1, and t 1 2. We say that the agent is young in the rst period, middle-aged in the second, and old in the third. Time is indexed by t 5 1, 2, ... . At time 1 there is also an old generation 21 that stays in the organization only for that period, and a middle-aged generation 0 that belongs to the organization in periods 1 and 2.
Every period t, the middle-aged generation t 2 1 has to make two decisions: (1) Note that the payoff of generation t 2 1 is affected only by a small number of the decisions taken in the organization: f t 2 (k1 1) , b t , f t , and b t 1 1 . We use subgame-perfect equilibrium as the solution concept.
III. Results

A. A Useful Tool
We start the analysis by deriving a useful result. Given any path g 5 {(b t ,f t )} t 5 1 of BIGs and FIGs, de ne the following pro le of simple trigger strategies (STSs):
m is de ned recursively as follows: m(h 1 ) 5 C and This result is useful because it shows that to check if a particular path of BIGs and FIGs can be sustained, it is enough to test if it can be sustained using STSs. Note that STSs are not the only strategies that can be used. For example, if g can be sustained using STSs, then it can also be sustained using "grim strategies" in which failure to produce the prescribed level of BIGs or FIGs ends cooperation forever. We focus on STSs because they have two appealing properties. First, they are simple. Second, the punishment phase lasts for only one period, and only the generation that failed to produce the prescribed level of BIGs and FIGs is punished.
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Using this tool it is easy to characterize the set of paths that can be sustained as a subgameperfect equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 2: A path g of BIGs and FIGs can be sustained as a subgame-perfect equilibrium if and only if
10 All of the proofs are in the Appendix. 11 Venkataraman Bhaskar (1998) shows that, in this type of overlapping generations game, the existence of cooperative equilibria depends crucially on the observability of the entire history of play. In particular, no cooperation is the unique equilibrium in pure strategies when generations can observe at most the actions of the last n predecessors.
B. Characterization of Equilibria
We start with an immediate observation: no FIGs are produced in an organization in which no other decisions are made.
12 Thus, the presence of BIGs, or other forms of exchange that will be discussed below, are essential to generate positive investments in FIGs. This section explores in detail the relationship between BIGs and FIGs.
It is useful to start with an organization in which there are only BIGs. Consider for a moment a version of the model in which the only action chosen every period t is how much to spend on BIGs ( f t 5 0 for all t). Everything else remains unchanged. This generates a game in which {bz0 # b # w # } is the action set for each generation.
Consider any path b 5 {b t } t5 1 of BIGs, and de ne a continuation surplus function given by
This measures the surplus generated by the IG trade implicit in b: the rst term measures the payoff for generation t 2 1 of producing b t and receiving b t 1 1 , the second term measures its payoff at generational autarky where no BIGs are produced. Note that the continuation surplus function is positive for all t if and only if the path b satis es condition (7). Thus, we conclude that a path of BIGs b can be sustained as a subgameperfect equilibrium if and only if S t B (b) $ 0 for all t. This characterization is very intuitive. Every generation needs to decide how many BIGs to give to the old, and in exchange it receives some BIGs from the next generation. In a STS, a generation that does not provide the prescribed amount of BIGs for the previous generation is punished by not receiving any BIGs when it becomes old. Thus, the cost of not cooperating is equivalent to returning to generational autarky. This characterization says that a path b can be sustained only if the amount of BIGs received in old age outweighs, for every generation, the cost of nancing the BIGs for the previous generation. Now consider the level of BIGs that can be sustained as a stationary equilibrium. By Proposition 2, a stationary level of BIGs b can be sustained if and only if 13 This has two implications that will be useful below. First, for any level of BIGs b [ (0, b B max ), the stationary path generates a positive surplus: every generation is better off producing and receiving this level of BIGs than in generational autarky. Second, inef cient overproduction and underproduction of BIGs is possible.
Using these insights we now characterize the level of FIGs that can be sustained in the full model. For any path g de ne the following continuation surplus function:
This function measures the value of the exchange implicit in g over generational autarky. It is equal to the continuation surplus of the exchange in BIGs implicit in g, minus the utility cost of nancing an amount of FIGs f t . Thus,
(g) whenever f t . 0. Note that the continuation surplus does not measure "social surplus" since it excludes the bene ts generated by FIGs. 12 This can be seen by setting B(z) 5 0 in condition (7), which implies that the only path that satis es the inequality is g 5 {(0, 0)} t5 1 .
13 Proposition 3 provides a simple but important insight. Positive investments in FIGs can take place even when present generations are sel sh. However, three conditions are necessary. First, the members of the organization must also face another exchange problem that requires cooperation. BIGs are one such possibility, but as we will see in Section III, subsection E, not the only one. Second, the non-FIG dimension must be capable of generating cooperative trades that generate a positive continuation surplus. Third, the generations must play strategies that link cooperation in the non-FIG dimension with sufcient investment in future generations. With this link, an agent receives a BIG in old age only if he purchases the right level of BIGs for the previous generation and invests enough on FIGs. Now consider the levels (b, f ) of BIGs and FIGs that can be sustained as stationary equilibria. By Proposition 3, (b, f ) can be sustained if and only if
Let f max (b) denote the maximum amount of FIGs that can be sustained with a level of BIGs equal to b. This function is de ned implicitly by the equation S st (b, f ) 5 0. By the Implicit Function Theorem, the function is de ned for any b $ 0, is continuously differentiable, and its derivative is given by Note that the bene ts generated by FIGs play no role in the characterization of this set. Changes in F(z) affect the optimal level of FIGs, but not the amount of FIGs that can be sustained. This is somewhat counterintuitive. One would expect IG investments with a more advantageous bene t-cost ratio to be more likely to be nanced; but this is not the case. As a result, investments in future generations that are relatively inexpensive are more likely to be funded than programs that generate larger net social bene ts but are also more costly.
Can the stationary Pareto-optimal level of investment in FIGs be sustained? To answer this question it is useful to introduce a parameter u that affects the bene ts generated by FIGs. Let
denote the optimal stationary level of BIGs and FIGs. As long as B and F satisfy the Inada FIGURE 1. SET OF STATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES condition, the solution is interior and satis es the FOCs
Furthermore, we have that
The locus (b * u , f * u ) is depicted in Figure  1 . 14 For small u, (b* u , f * u ) lies in the interior of the sustainable set and thus optimal production, and even inef cient overproduction, are possible. As u increases, the optimal level of FIGs f * u eventually increases beyond what can be sustained with the BIGs available in the organization. This establishes the following result.
PROPOSITION 4: Inef cient overproduction of FIGs can be sustained as a stationary equilibrium if and only if S(b*, f *) . 0. In this case, any level of FIGs f
including the optimal stationary level f *, can be sustained as a stationary equilibrium.
As Figure 1 starkly illustrates, the model generates a large number of equilibria: in some of them IG cooperation takes place, in others it does not. This is common in models of longlived institutions that use noncooperative game theory. The equilibrium set could be reduced by imposing equilibrium re nements like Markovian equilibrium or renegotiation proofness. However, given that so far game theory has not provided a fully satisfactory justi cation for such re nements, we proceed by characterizing the entire equilibrium set. Future theoretical developments might be able to identify variables that affect the coordination of expectations across generations, and thus rule out some of the equilibria.
We conclude this section with a comparison of forward and backward IG exchange. From a technological point of view, BIGs and FIGs are not that different. Both types of exchange require agents to provide a good that is valuable for another generation, and in exchange bene t from a good that is provided for them. However, from an incentive point of view, they are signi cantly different. First, even when BIGs and FIGs generate identical bene ts [i.e., when B(z) 5 F(z)], BIGs can be sustained in organizations that only make this type of decisions, but FIGs cannot be sustained in isolation. A positive level of investment in FIGs can arise only by linking them with BIGs. Second, the cost and bene ts of BIGs are crucial in determining the level of BIGs and FIGs that can be sustained. By contrast, the bene ts generated by FIGs play no role. Third, the optimal stationary level of BIGs is always sustainable. This is not the case for FIGs.
C. What Type of FIGs Can Be Sustained?
The basic model ignores some important properties of FIGs. For example, environmental programs often generate bene ts for multiple generations, including those making the investment, and have uncertain returns. In this section we show that these issues do not alter the insights obtained above.
Consider rst the case of multiple bene ciaries and risk. For concreteness, consider a FIG for which the preferences of generation t are given by
where v t is a random shock realized at the beginning of period t. In this case, the FIG produced at time t can bene t every future generation, including generation t.
It is straightforward to see that the path of sustainable FIGs has not changed. Given that FIGs are nonexcludable, past investments in FIGs do not affect the incentive constraint of the decision maker. As a result, the characterization provided in Propositions 3 and 4 still holds, and the set of stationary equilibrium outcomes is still the one depicted in Figure 1 . The lesson is clear: risks, lags, and multiple bene ciaries affect the optimal level of investment in FIGs, but not the level that can be sustained. Now consider the case in which the generation investing in FIGs also bene ts from them. For concreteness, suppose that the preferences of generation t 2 1, the one making decisions in period t, are given by
where G is concave, continuously differentiable, and increasing. The only difference with the basic model is that generation t 2 1 now gets a direct bene t G( f t ) from investing in FIGs.
To analyze this case de ne a new continuation surplus function given by
The key difference with the previous case is that now generations want to produce some of the FIG even if cooperation breaks down. This is re ected in the second term, which is the payoff at generational autarky. Proposition 5 shows that underinvestment in FIGs still takes place unless two conditions are met. First, the agents must play strategies that link BIGs and FIGs. Second, the BIGs must generate a large enough continuation surplus that can be used to give incentives to invest beyond the short-sighted level.
A characterization of the set of stationary equilibrium outcomes illustrates this point. Note a few properties of the equilibrium set. First, (0, 0) is no longer an equilibrium. This follows from the fact that agents invest in FIGs in the absence of cooperation. Second, consider a parameterization of the preferences given by
where u measures the relative fraction of the bene ts that are internalized by the decision maker. Let (b* u , f* u ) denote the optimal stationary level of production. As before, the optimal level of FIGs is sustainable when u is small but not when it is large. Finally, the equilibrium set cuts the horizontal axis (i.e., there is an equilibrium in which no FIGs are produced) if and only if Thus, when the surplus generated by BIGs is large relative to the value of FIGs, there are pathological equilibria in which no generation invests in FIGs even though they bene t directly from those investments.
D. The Role of Altruism
Another concern with the basic model is the assumption of sel sh generations. The effect of altruism on the analysis depends on the speci c form that it takes. In particular, one needs to distinguish between paternalistic and nonpaternalistic altruism. With paternalistic altruism, the level of FIGs that future generations consume enters as an argument in the utility function of present generations. With nonpaternalistic altruism, it is the utility level of future generations that is internalized by present generations.
The analysis of paternalistic altruism is equivalent to the case discussed at the end of the previous section. The only difference is that the function G is now interpreted as altruism, instead of a direct bene t from consuming the FIG. Therefore, in this case a link between BIGs and FIGs is still needed to generate optimal levels of production.
The case of nonpaternalistic altruism is qualitatively different. Consider, in particular, the dynastic model in Robert Barro (1974) . In this model there is no IG exchange problem. The organization behaves like an in nitely lived agent that perfectly internalizes the future spillovers of investing in FIGs. Thus, in applicationsfor which the dynastic model is a good description of behavioral motives, the issues studied in this paper do not arise.
Casual evidence suggests that IG altruism is at work in most of the applications of this model: voters care about the future of humanity and parents care about their children. However, the key question is which is the form that their altruism takes. Although a lot of work remains to be do done in this area, and a consensus does not exist yet, some existing evidence suggests paternalistic altruism might be a better approximation.
E. Investment in Future Generations Without BIGs
This section shows that BIGs are not the only type of exchange that can be used to sustain FIGs. To see this, consider the following generalization of the model. Every period t, generation t 2 1 makes two choices: (1) how much to invest in FIGs, just like before, and (2) This argument can be pushed even further. In organizations in which more than two decisions are made, say if there are several BIGs, it is possible to link several of these decisions to FIGs. If each individual BIG generates a surplus, each additional BIG provides additional incentives to provide FIGs. In the context of the political economy of IG public goods discussed in Section V, pay-as-you-go social insurance, the choice of capital tax rates, and the decision to honor the national debt can be used simultaneously to sustain investment in IG public goods.
IV. The Effect of Mandatory Provision
The previous analysis has shown that there are always equilibria in which FIGs and/or BIGs are not provided. A natural question to ask is whether the introduction of minimal provision constraints can improve the outcomes generated by these organizations. These types of constraints are common. For example, taxnanced public education places a constraint on the minimum amount of educational expenditures that a parent can give to his child, and mandatory old age social insurance imposes a similar constraint for the case of BIGs.
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In this section we study the effect that minimal provision constraints have on voluntary provision. Denote the minimum constraint by (b, f ). These constraints have no effect on the payoffs, but shrink the action sets to {(b,
To characterize the equilibrium set for this case we need to de ne a new continuation surplus function. Let g be any path of BIGs and FIGs satisfying the constraints and de ne
It is straightforward to extend the arguments in Propositions 1 and 2 to show that a path g can be sustained as an equilibrium if and only if S t (b,f ) (g) $ 0 for all t. This provides a full characterization of the equilibrium set. The only difference is that now the payoff of generational autarky has changed to V(w # 2 f 2 b) 1 B(b), which has implications for the levels of BIGs and FIGs that can be sustained.
Let
, and b min (b, f ) denote, respectively, the maximum and minimum level of FIGs and BIGs that can be sustained as a stationary equilibrium in an institution with constraints (b, f ). The following proposition describes the effect of (1) introducing a minimum constraint only on BIGs ( f 5 0), and (2) introducing a minimum constraint only on FIGs (b 5 0). The effect of introducing a constraint in both goods is discussed below. This result shows that there is a perverse institutional trade-off in this class of organizations. The imposition of a minimal provision constraint in BIGs eliminates the possibility of the bad equilibrium in which no BIGs are produced, but it also reduces the maximum level of investment in future generations that can be sustained.
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The constraint for FIGs f has a different effect. Increases in f have a positive effect on the maximum and minimum level of FIGs that can be sustained, and a negative effect on the maximum amount of BIGs. The result is also driven by the effect of f on generational autarky payoff, given by V(w # 2 f ) 1 B(0), which is decreasing in f. As a result, as shown in Figure  4 (right-hand side), bundles (b, f ) that were not sustainable before, now become sustainable. Now consider the effect of introducing a minimum provision constraint in both FIGs and BIGs. Since the analysis is very similar to the previous two cases, the details are omitted. Once more, the impact on FIG provision depends on the payoff at generational autarky. If
0) the equilibrium set with constraints is a subset of the equilibrium set for the case of no constraints, and is similar to the one depicted in Figure 4 (left-hand side) except for one minor change: the points (b, f ) for which f , f have to be removed. As a result, the constraint decreases the maximum level of FIGs that can be sustained. By contrast, if (0) , the equilibrium set resembles the one depicted in Figure 4 (righthand side) with one minor change: the points (b, f ) for which b , b have to be removed from the set. In this case, the maximum level of FIGs that can be sustained increases.
Minimal provision constraints for BIGs and FIGs have very different effects. Whereas increases in the constraint for BIGs crowd out voluntary cooperation in BIGs and FIGs, increases in the constraint for FIGs increase the total amount of FIGs that can be sustained. This asymmetry is interesting because, to the extent that the minimal provision constraints are determined endogenously, present generations have an incentive to introduce minimal provision constraints in BIGs but not on FIGs.
V. Applications
A. Investment in Children Within the Family
A natural interpretation of the model is as a theory of IG exchange within a family that is either sel sh or exhibits paternalistic altruism. Families exchange two types of IG goods: (1) FIGs, that are provided by parents to their young children in the form of education and parental care, and (2) BIGs, that adult children provide to their aging parents in the form of care, insurance, and status. In this interpretation k 5 0.
As shown in Section III, subsections B and D, in a sel sh family investment in children can be positive only if there is a link between BIGs and FIGs, and in families with paternalistic altruism the link is required to generate investments in excess of what parents are willing to invest on their own. For example, without BIGs, a parent might be willing to nance a high school education, but not college. In both types of families, at least part of the investments are driven by strategic considerations: parents believe that (excess) investments in FIGs are the price that they pay for getting the BIGs that they desire in old age.
The model predicts the existence of three types of families. First, families that link BIGs and FIGs sustain a high level of investment in 18 Bernheim and Whinston (1998) obtain results with a similar avor for nonintergenerational contracting problems. In many economic relationships complete contracts are impossible. In this case, voluntary cooperation is needed in the dimensions where the contract is incomplete. In this context, they show that it might be advantageous to purposefully leave some dimensions out of the contract to increase the incentive to cooperate in the dimensions that cannot be included.
both. Second, gerontocratic families with high levels of provision for the elderly, but low investment in children. Third, "dysfunctional" families that underprovide both. Casual observation suggests that there is signi cant variation within and across cultures. Endogenous preferences are likely to be an important part of the explanation, specially if culture and institutions in uence the amount of altruism within families. But family norms might also play an important role: some societies and families converge to cooperative codes of behavior, others do not.
As shown in Section III, in order for FIGs to be provided, there must be a BIG that generates a positive surplus. This is guaranteed as long as the elderly place a marginal value on the rst unit of the BIG that exceeds the marginal cost for the middle-aged. Although in our stylized model this is imposed as an assumption [condition B9(0) . V9(w # ) in Proposition 3], several of the BIGs exchanged within families satisfy these characteristics. Consider, for example, the case of insurance. Retirees face risks that are not insurable through nancial markets such as a collapse of the stock market, or a crime that signi cantly reduces their wealth. As long as the serial correlation of the adverse shocks is low, there are gains from exchange between the middle-age and the elderly. Kotlikoff and Avia Spivak (1981) show that a similar argument holds for the provision of "annuity insurance" within the family when annuity markets are imperfect.
The results on mandatory provision also have interesting implications for the family. Suppose that the government introduces a law that forces the middle-aged to provide a BIG that they used to provide voluntarily. This would be the case, for example, if the good is nanced with taxes on the middle-aged. This has three types of effects (see Figure 3) . First, it increases the minimal amount of BIGs that any elderly person receives. If a fraction of the families in the economy are in a bad equilibrium in which BIGs are not provided, the policy improves the welfare of these elderly. Second, it decreases the maximum amount of voluntary provision of BIGs that can be sustained. Thus, if the public program is not large enough to fully crowd out family care, the welfare of the elderly who belong to families that are in a good equilibrium can go down. 19 Finally, it reduces the maximum amount of FIGs that can be sustained, and thus can crowd out investment in children within the family. 20 These mechanisms could contribute to our understanding of some trends that have taken place in the last few decades of the twentieth century: (1) an increase in the generosity of government transfers to the elderly, (2) an increase in measures of family disintegration, (3) a decrease in the amount of time that parents spend with their children, (4) a decrease in educational performance, and (5) a decrease in the birth rate.
B. Why Is Social Security Good for the Environment?
Now consider the political economy of IG exchange. In this case the FIG is an IG public good, such as the environment or R&D, and the BIG is a pay-as-you-go social insurance program such as social security or Medicare.
This application requires a slight specialization of the model. The key difference is that now decisions are made by majority rule, and thus many agents participate in the decisionmaking process. Also, to further explore the nature of BIGs, we model the social security program explicitly, and consider a more realistic demographic structure.
21 As we will see, the basic insights remain unchanged. 19 Whether or not there is a reduction on the total level of BIGs consumed by this type of families depends on the equilibrium that was played originally. As can be seen from Figure 4 , a minimum provision constraints eliminates some but not all equilibria. A similar comment applies to the next statement. 20 Of course, this assumes that the government intervenes only in BIGs. One could argue that the problem disappears if the government intervenes in both BIG and FIGs. But, at best, this can only be a partial solution. First of all, government programs require revenue that must be raised with costly distortionary taxes. Second, these programs are not likely to be tailored optimally to the speci c needs of each family. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the nature of some BIGs and FIGs is such that they can only be provided in the context of the family. For example, there does not seem to be a substitute for the impact that parents' care and love have on the emotional and character development of children. 21 Another reason for complicating the demographic structure is that with voting the three-period model is a knife-edge case. It generates results that do not hold as long as agents can live for ve or more periods.
Agents live for nine periods, each period representing a decade of life. They are dependent children in the rst two periods, workers in the next ve, and retirees in the last two. There is no population growth. Workers receive a wage w; everyone else has no income. Agents can borrow and save at the constant interest rate r . 0, which implies that the economy is dynamically ef cient.
Every period society needs to choose the size of a balanced pay-as-you-go social security system. Let T t s denote the lump-sum payroll tax paid by workers in period t, and B t s 5 5 2 T t s denote the bene ts for retirees. ) 1 F({E t 2 k } k# 2 1 ). Note that the social security BIG is a transfer, instead of a commodity that enters directly in the utility function.
Consider a social security system T s 5 {T t s } t5 1 . The continuation value of the system for generation t, at age a, is given by
for a worker of age a, and
for a retiree of age a 5 8, 9. At its name indicates, CV t a (z) measures the value for an agent of age a of keeping the social security system going. The continuation value will play a role analogous to the surplus generated by BIGs in the standard model: investment in FIGs can be sustained only as long as the continuation value is positive for a majority of voters in every period.
To simplify we discretize the policy space. The rst part of the result provides necessary and suf cient conditions for social security to be sustainable by majority rule. As before, it is useful to focus rst in the case in which there are only BIGs. For the purpose of building intuition consider stationary policies in which T t s 5 T s for all t. Since the economy is dynamically ef cient, the continuation value of social security for suf ciently young voters is 22 The bene t formula follows from the fact that there are ve workers for every two retirees. 23 The results below hold for any political institution in which Condorcet winners are selected whenever they exist.
negative. Let a # (T s ) denote the smallest age at which the continuation value becomes positive. Workers with a , a # (T s ) always vote against social security. Similarly, retirees always vote for the system since they do not have to pay more payroll taxes. This implies that social security's fate depends on the vote of the middleaged group, with ages between a # (T s ) and 7. Since seven generations (a 5 3, ... , 9) cast a vote every period, the system passes with at least four votes as long as the middle-aged vote positively and a # (T s ) # 6. Note that the middleaged vote for social security not because they care about current retirees, but because they correctly believe that otherwise they will not be able to receive bene ts.
The second part of the result provides necessary and suf cient conditions for a positive level of investment in FIGs to be sustained by majority rule. The forces at work are also similar to the ones for the basic model. First, present voters care about social security but not about FIGs such as the environment. Thus, they vote against the environment unless future voters play a voting strategy that links BIGs and FIGs: a generation is punished in retirement if, during its voting years, society failed to provide social security for its parents or to invest sufciently in FIGs. Note, however, that the punishment is conditioned on the outcome of the election, and not on the voting behavior of particular generations, since individual votes are not observable. Second, there is a limit to how much investment in BIGs can be sustained. A generation is willing to vote for FIGs only if the taxes that it has to pay, (Ê t /7), are less than the continuation value of the system, CV t a (T s ). As before, the bene ts that the FIGs generate on future generations play no role on their sustainability, only the direct bene ts for the generations making the investment do. This implies that programs such as the Clean Air Act, which generate bene ts in the short term, are more likely to be nanced than programs like global warming prevention, where most of the bene ts appear only in the very long run. In particular, there could be programs that generate much larger bene ts in the long run, and have a better social rate of return, but that are not produced because those bene ts only accrue to unborn generations. Bohn (1998) has studied the political economy of pay-as-you-go social insurance in the United States. He calculates the continuation value of social security for voters of different ages and shows that it is negative for young voters, but strictly positive for voters at or above the median age. As a result, social security is sustainable and it generates surplus that can be used to sustain investments in the environment. This is the reason why social security can be good for the environment.
Other public BIGs that could be used to sustain FIGs include the choice of capital tax rates and the decision to honor the national debt. Consider the rst example. Every generation needs to save for retirement and can do so only if future generations refrain from expropriating its savings. However, every generation would like to expropriate the current elderly through a 100-percent capital tax, but not to be expropriated in old age. In this case producing the BIG takes the form of selecting a low capital tax for the current period.
Propositions 3 and 7 provide a different perspective on the political economy of logrolling. The prevailing view in the literature is that logrolling is often a cause of inef ciencies because it allows inef cient "pork barrel" projects to be enacted. 24 One can think of the link between BIGs and FIGs as an IG and dynamic form of logrolling in which agents who favor the environment are willing to vote for social security, but only if current retirees invested in future generations when they were young. This form of logrolling is bene cial since it is essential to sustain investment in future generations.
The results on mandatory provision have interesting political economy implications. Consider a constitutional reform requiring that a suf ciently large minimum level of social security bene ts be paid every period unless a supermajority votes against it. If the supermajority requirement is strong enough, the reform gives veto power to the elderly, who always vote for social security. In this case, middle-aged workers know that social security cannot be voted down and thus have no incentive to invest in FIGs. Similarly, some analysts have proposed eliminating the current system and moving to a system of personal savings accounts. If expropriation of the balances in these accounts 24 For example, see Gordon Tullock (1998). through taxation is very unlikely (perhaps because of constitutional or other legal restrictions), the retirement bene ts of current workers do not depend on the actions of future generations. This eliminates the need for IG cooperation in social security, and thus a source of surplus that could be used to sustain investment in future generations.
A surprising implication of the model is that the aging of the electorate can be bene cial for future generations. To see this, consider a small complication of the political economy model in which, for exogenous reasons, only a fraction of the population in each age group votes. 25 Proposition 7 then changes as follows. First, a pay-asyou go social security system is sustainable as long as it generates a positive continuation value for a majority of the population that actually votes. Second, a positive level of FIGs can be sustained as long as if CV t a (T t s ) $ (Ê t /7) for a majority of the population that actually votes.
Suppose, for the purposes of this example, that the continuation value of social security becomes positive at age 6. If the share of agents that vote is constant across age groups, social security can be sustained but FIGs cannot (they only get three votes, those of ages 6 to 8, since the eldest always vote against FIGs). Compare this with a situation in which voters in ages 6 to 9 become twice more likely to vote than younger voters in ages 3 to 5. In this case, the voters in ages 6 to 8 constitute a majority and investment in FIGs can be sustained. Intuitively, any demographic change that increases the continuation surplus of the "median voter" increases the amount of FIGs that can be sustained.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper has studied the ability of nonmarket institutions, such as the government and the family, to invest optimally in future generations. We have shown that BIGs, such as social security, play a crucial role in sustaining investment in FIGs: without them, investment in FIGs is inef ciently low; with them, even optimal investment by sel sh generations is possible.
We have shown that IG organizations can converge to three types of equilibria: underprovision of BIGs and FIGs, provision of BIGs but not FIGs, and provision of both. This multiplicity of equilibria has normative and positive implications. From a normative point of view, the multiplicity represents an opportunity. The link between BIGs and FIGs is a mechanism that could be harnessed by institutional designers to sustain investment in future generations. Consider, for example, the introduction of a constitutional constraint that requires a minimal amount of expenditure in FIGs for every dollar spent on the elderly. This constraint forces a link between BIGs and FIGs analogous to the one that arises in the equilibrium with positive investment in future generations. As long as the required amount of FIG expenditures do not exceed the surplus that the "median voter" gets from pay-as-you-go social insurance, the reform kills the bad equilibrium in which BIGs are provided but FIGs are not.
26 Another potentially useful reform would make the link between BIGs and FIGs more transparent by requiring legislation in BIGs and FIGs to be debated and voted on together, as a package.
From a positive point of view, the multiplicity of equilibria calls for empirical study. Casual observation suggests that the political process has not coordinated to the "good equilibrium," since social security and the environment do not seem to be linked in the public debate. However, the link might play an important role in other organizations such as the family. After all, the quid pro quo nature of intergenerational exchange is more transparent within a family than at the social level. Parents seem to understand that their behavior towards their children in uences their emotional development and how they are treated in old age. By contrast, it might be more dif cult for a voter to understand that present policies could affect the voting attitudes of future generations. Nevertheless, given the lack of a solid theoretical foundation for choosing one equilibrium over another, the best the theory can do for now is characterize the entire set of possible organizational outcomes, and provide guidelines for how to bring the theory to the data.
APPENDIX PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
Suf ciency is obvious, now look at necessity. Consider any path g 5 {(b t ,f t )} t5 1 that can be sustained as a subgame-perfect equilibrium. It must be the case that, for all t, (A1) V~w # 2b t 2f t ! 1 F~f t 2~k 1 1! ! 1 B~b t 1 1 ! $ V~w # ! 1 F~f t 2~k 1 1 ! ! 1 B~0!.
This follows because (b t ,f t ) must be a best response along the equilibrium path. If this inequality is violated, generation t 2 1 is better off choosing (0, 0) in history h t 5 ((b 1 ,f 1 ) Once more, (0, 0) is the best possible deviation. Equation (A1) implies that the inequality is satis ed.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
By Proposition 1, it suf ces to show that the STSs associated with g are satis ed if and only if (7) is satis ed. Let s t (h t ) 5 (s t B (h t ), s t F (h t )) be the STS associated with g. For this strategy pro le to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium it must be the case that, for all histories h t with m(h t ) 5 C, Similarly, for the STS to be an equilibrium, it must be the case that for all histories h t with m(h t ) 5 P, If (7) is satis ed, then these two conditions hold and the STS is a subgame-perfect equilibrium. If (7) is violated, the rst condition cannot hold and the STS is not an equilibrium.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
(1) Follows directly from Proposition 2. To conclude the proof, consider a marginal increase in the production of FIGs in every period. The impact on the utility of generations born after period k 1 1 is given by 2V9~w # 2b 2f ! 1 G9~f ! 1 F9~f ! . 0. 
